What I’ve learned

     There is something deeply attractive in the idea that every person, irrespective of citizenship and territorial legislation, has particular basic rights that others ought to respect. But the preoccupation with the concept of human rights has been irregular and erratic: human rights have taken center stage in intellectual dialogue during three historical periods - namely, the Enlightenment period, post-WWII and our current time and yet, has almost disappeared from discourse at all other moments. This (the historical unevenness of the [West's] commitment to human rights) has prompted many academics to view the central idea of human rights – being something people possess without specific legislation, as foundationally dubious and lacking in coherence. The debate on the legality of human rights is thus not concerned with the weight of human rights in applying this concept to issues on the ground (as it is not usually disputed that the invoking of human rights can be politically powerful) but rather, it is concerned with the theoretical grounding of the concept. Where do human rights come from?

     Human rights are often regarded as universal because they are theorized as the rights one has simply because one is human. However, I have come to realize that the concept of human rights largely embodies the ideological priorities of the West. Even the theoretical grounding of the concept resonates clearly with liberalism’s understanding of the relationship between the individual and the state. The source of human rights involves an individual giving up one set of rights - that is, his/her natural rights or rights that are prior to social order for the sake of the general community. In return, the individual gains another set of rights – that is, rights that promise equality. The association between the state and individual thus becomes one of contract in which both sides have rights and obligations. For instance, the individual should obey the laws and in return, the state should provide the individual with security. But I have also discovered that it is this granting of rights, which can be used by the state to justify an excessive use of power. The Argentine dictatorship’s removal of ‘dissidents,’ for example, was grounded on its obligation to the Argentine society to protect its national identity and culture. Therefore, perhaps, the greatest thing this class has taught me is that human rights are not an ideal concept and the universality to which human rights standards aspire should be largely contested – particularly, in today’s world where human rights are being constantly invoked.